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We’re on a road to nowhere 
Come on inside 
Takin’ that ride to nowhere 
We’ll take that ride…1 
 
We live in an interwoven world of temporal relations 
where our lives are embedded in a ceaseless process 
of unforeseeable changes. Every single moment we 
encounter is suffused with ephemerality and uncer-
tainty. In consequence, it is impossible to predict on 
which path this journey of life might take us. The 
only certainty we can be sure of, is that the next 
moment will arrive. Hence our being in this world is 
not fixed or immanent, but transitional and        
indeterminable. This perspective may be generalized 
into a core principle of reality wherein life, as the       
paleontologist Stephen J. Gould suggested, consists  
 
                                                 




of a series of stable states punctuated by unpredict-
able events whose occurrence helps to establish the 
next stable plateau. When translated into our every-
day encounters with the environment, this theory     
implies that our engagements are made up of    
structurally stable moments in which we part of an          
evolutionary system of changing relations. Thus we 
constantly find ourselves in nascent situations that 
coincide with different spatial configurations—a 
procedure by which we transition from one state to 
another.  
 
As we engage in this matrix of evolving links and 
interchanges, we not only transition from one    
moment to another, we also continually re-position 
ourselves—a notion by which our locale is to be 
found in the idea of moving points, animated by the 
interaction of different forces. From that point of 
view, the notion of place may no longer be          
considered independently from human interactions, 
or as something that is motionless and fixed to a 
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permanent location. Rather, place materializes in a 
continuum of temporal relations wherein an      
assortment of different energies converge. Within 
this process place should be considered a provisional 
aggregate—an emerging field—embedded between 
the interacting conditions of stability and instability. 
In other words, the process by which place appears 
originates in the differentiating restlessness of the 
becoming of something and the fading away of     
something. Only then, only between these two             
circumstances, can a location emerge. Therefore, 
what we require is the general insight that places are 
processes; they do not possess a single, immutable 
identity. Neither space nor place manifest immobile, 
static reality, but are subject to a reality that is    
generated and modified through interactions,    
narratives, and representations of different cultures.  
 
However, this viewpoint does not correlate with our 
currently prevalent perception and understanding of 
place. Place is still entangled in a paradigm whereby 
its existence is conceived as being without any    
human interaction, as a permanent condition,    
confined to one of any number of demarcated and 
already established locations between which     
movements occur. Why is it that we still adhere to 
such a belief? Does this thinking result from the 
commonly held notion of place as an a priori      
condition of our existence? Or have we silently  
accepted our disengagement with place, incapable of         
acknowledging a connection between being        
emplaced and our ability to change position, both 
figuratively and abstractly? We may wonder about 
place as we surf the Internet or travel on an airplane, 
but by and large we presume this question to be 
settled, that there is nothing more to be said on the 
subject. Yet, on the contrary, there is a great deal to 
say on this, especially since we are constantly im-
mersed in these countless engagements through 
which we continually (re-)connect points and    
intersect with our own sets of connections.  
 
When the musician and songwriter David Byrne and 
his band penned the lyrics for “We’re on a road to 
nowhere”, he exposed us to a strange journey with an 
unusual reality. By taking away the option, or rather 
necessity, of arriving in or at any particular place, he 
not only challenges our perception of place as a 
Vitruvian firmitas2, but also our participation in it. 
This is certainly not an easy idea to comprehend, 
since place is a vital component of our existence. 
Aristotle acknowledged it, making ‘where’ one of the 
ten most important and indispensable qualities of 
every substance.3 To be is to be somewhere, and to be 
somewhere is to be emplaced. Obviously, we have no 
choice in the matter; there is no escaping it—even 
when we are traveling on a road to nowhere. 
Nothing we do is unplaced.  
 
Yet Byrne’s lyrics suggest our travels are no longer 
directed towards a fixed point of arrival, but the 
complete absence of one. A seemingly odd situation 
indeed, since we find ourselves moving towards a 
destination which is said to be located “nowhere” 
and, consequently, shows no signs of being fixed to a 
geographic location whence we might depart or 
where we might arrive. On closer scrutiny this    
perspective takes an even odder twist. Not only does 
this “road to nowhere” lead to a place that cannot be 
tied to a specific and permanent location, it also 
suggests that place can no longer be understood as 
something that actually exists prior to our arrival. 
Thus, as we travel through this world of temporal 
relations, place may no longer be perceived as a 
permanent or pre-existing entity, but as a state of 
being. 
 
That place is not rooted or anchored to any        
particular location does not, however, imply that its      
existence or identity has been relegated to a         
non-place, as described in an essay and book of the 
same title by the French anthropologist Marc Augé. 
In this essay “Non-Places: Introduction to an       
Anthropology of Supermodernity”4, Augé compares 
places vis-à-vis non-places. He concludes: “…if place 
can be defined as relational, historical and concerned with 
identity, then space which cannot be defined as relational, 
or historical, or concerned with identity will be a          
non-place…”5 Therefore, “[t]he travelers space may thus 
                                                 
2 The term ‘Vitruvian firmitas’ stems from the Roman architect 
Marcus Vitruvius Pollio. In his book De architectura (Ten books 
of Architecture) Vitruvius argues that a structure must exhibit the 
three qualities of firmitas, utilitas, venustas—in other words, it 
must be durable, useful, and beautiful. 
3 Aristotle, Physics, transl. Robin Waterfield, Oxford 1996. 
4 Marc Augé, Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of 
Supermodernity, transl. John Howe, London, New York 1995. 
5 Augé, Non Places (see note 4), 77–78. 






be the archetype of non-place.”6 The journey Byrne 
invites us on is obviously of a very different nature. 
While Augé uses the term to describe a concrete 
place, mainly associated with transit- and                       
communication-oriented uses like airports,        
highways, or supermarkets, Byrne’s description 
reveals place as a transitory state, in which its     
existence has been liberated from any particular 
location, use, form, or duration.  
 
Yet the liberation of place from its concrete presence 
does not allow us to conclude that its existence is 
then utopian in character. Non-places are real 
places. They exist indeed, as Foucault concluded in 
his lecture “Of Other Spaces”.7 In this lecture Fou-
cault establishes the concept of ‘heterotopia’—in 
contrast to utopias which, as he points out, “…[are] 
the preserve solely of things … that in fact have no     
place…”8 These are the real places, he says. They are 
the contested and inverted counter-sites within 
every culture. They exist outside of all other places, 
since they “are absolutely different from all sites that they 
reflect and speak about”.9 But “…[to] make a difference in 
the social fabric, a heterotopia must posses a focus for the 
application of force”—a force however, that is nowhere 
to be found, “…but in the marginal location of the   
heterotopia itself.”10 Accordingly, non-places are not  
phenomena that only ever find expression on the 
periphery. Rather, they organize themselves hetero-
geneously within space as contextual marginal situa-
tions. These other places are in a constant state of 
flux and change, which as Byrne indirectly           
described, can neither be tied to a physically extant 
place nor ascribed to defined programmatic       
purposes. They embody generic places that appear 
everywhere within a culture in forever changing 
constellations. And, to use Jean Baudrillard’s words, 
wherever an attempt is made to “ascribe [to place] a 
function, all the others will take on the task of turning it 
                                                 
6 Augé, Non-Places (see note 4), 86. 
7 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”, trans. Jay Miskowiec, 
Diacritics 16, 1, Baltimore 1986. 
8 Michel Foucault, Les heteropias. Le corps utopique. Published in 
German as: Die Heterotopien – Der utopische Körper, transl. 
Michael Bischoff, Frankfurt am Main 2005, 11. 
9 Foucault “Of Other Spaces” (see note 7), 25. 
10 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place, A Philosophical History, 
Berkely 1997, 300. 
into a non-place, of changing the rules of the game”.11 
Consequently, every non-place is dependent upon 
potential opponents. By shifting their positions, it is 
they who create new conditions. In other words, by 
altering a functionalist identity they generate a    
non-place, an exterior that erodes the law of       
prevailing conditions. 
 
This line of thought is also pursued by Foucault. In 
“The History of Sexuality” he examines how forces 
variously interacting within a social framework lead 
to the emergence of new game rules or power      
relations. Here he uses the central concept of the 
‘Other’ to draw attention to the ‘exterior’ of these            
non-places.12 The ‘exterior’ stands for a force that 
has no being other than that of a relation: it is an 
action that both stands in correspondence with other 
actions as well as exerting influence on them. Thus, 
for  Foucault ‘power’ is composed from a plurality of 
forces that occupy and organize a territory: that of a 
game which transforms, amplifies and inverts the 
balance of these forces in incessant struggles and 
disputes. In other words, a multifaceted game that is 
entirely consummate with a heterogeneous and 
decentrally organized edifice of power. 
 
In this, Foucault is evidently distancing himself from 
the disciplinary mechanisms he previously devel-
oped in “Discipline and Punish”, where he describes 
the object as the primary set of instruments for 
transferring ‘power’ onto the subject and thus    
permeating it. Here, instead, he argues that ‘power’ 
no longer instrumentalizes itself via the object, but 
acts as a productive force which is constellated in the 
relations among the subjects against the background 
                                                 
11 Jean Baudrillard, Architektur: Wahrheit oder Radikalität, transl. 
Colin Fournier, Graz, Wien 1999, 18. 
12 In Foucault, one has to distinguish between exterior and exteri-
ority. Whereas the term exteriority is constituted through two 
interacting forms (such as forms of state), the exterior relates 
solely to force—a force, however, that must always stand in rela-
tion to other forces. And when a force stands in relation to other 
forces, these forces inevitably indicate an irreducible exterior that 
no longer possesses form. The force possesses no other object and 
no other subject than the force itself. It has no other being than 
that of a relationship: it is an “action that interacts with other 
actions”. Hence the forces he is describing here no longer operate 
within a field of forms but in a field of the exterior, where, as it 
were, place is a non-place and ‘history’ is in a state of constant 
self-renewal—in other words, a space open exclusively for change. 
Cf. The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction, transl. 
Robert Hurley, New York 1990. 






of a context. Accordingly, he no longer considers 
‘power’ to be concentrated solely on the side of the 
object, but instead sees it manifested in the actions 
performed by subjects among one another and in 
their relationship to their immediate environment—
an idea also pursued by Lefèbvre. He too associates 
the production of space with the experience of   
corporeality in the individual’s engagement with 
other contexts. In other words, space is socially  
produced, but it is to like degree also the medium 
through which social relations assume material  
presence. Thus subjects are tied into a complex   
matrix of power which “is exercised from innumerable 
points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile  
relations”.13 In this context, one might then say, 
‘power’ stands for the incarnation of ceaselessly self-
regenerating forces whose constellations are the 
product of complex strategic situations in society. As 
such it      amounts to an uncontrollable cluster of 
relations that pertains to no specific singular form 
(such as a particular form of state). It can neither be 
possessed, acquired, nor even removed—“it passes 
through the hands of the mastered no less than through 
the hands of the masters (since it passes through every 
related force).”14 Hence, ‘power’ is the multifarious                 
interconnectedness of individual disparities among 
individuals. It is solely the sheer force of power that 
is capable of generating disruptions and discontinui-
ties, and it is these, Foucault argues, that are required 
to change the prevailing balance of power. As a  
result, new tensions recurrently arise—tensions 
which, as the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu points out, 
find expression in a terrain suffused with social in-
teractions, where individuals can constantly reposi-
tion themselves.15 Thus each emergent field corre-
sponds to a “potentially open space of play whose 
boundaries are dynamic [… ,] devoid of inventor and  
                                                 
13 Michel Foucault, Method, The History of Sexuality, Volume I., 
transl. Robert Hurley, New York 1990, 94. 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Strategies or the non-stratefied: the thought of 
the outside (power), in: Foucault, transl. Sean Hand, London, 
1988, 71. 
15 Here, the social sphere of action is constituted on three levels: 1: 
Diverse, more or less autonomously operating domains which in 
this context can be described as fields of force or power. 2: The 
‘habitus’, behind which stands an individual agent, whose social 
competence is made up of socially acquired dispositions. 3: The 
synthesis produced by the convergence of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’. 
much more fluid and complex than any game that one 
might ever design.”16 
 
Every game, as well as the demarcation and         
positioning of individuals, follows ‘rules’ specific to 
each field, which always culminate in cultural      
legitimation and social ‘power’. Consequently, where 
there is ‘power’ there is also opposition. This      
opposition represents the apodictic counterforce 
within the prevailing balance of power that is      
capable of articulating, charting, and overstepping 
boundaries. Hence, every power structure requires 
its own ‘oppositional’ protagonists, border crossers 
that keep the social fabric in motion. They are the 
turning point (or “critical point”, as Bourdieu has 
termed this phenomenon), infiltrating society like 
shifting ruptures and inducing transformation. 
 
In the early twentieth century the sociologist Robert 
Ezra Park coined the term “marginal man” to describe 
this kind of figure who, as in Foucault’s heterotopias, 
has located his existence “not on the periphery of one 
particular culture [but] in the transitional zone.”17 Thus 
the “marginal man” is not an individual on the     
periphery but a figure at the center who commutes 
between different cultures. He is, as   described in 
“Human Migration and the Marginal Man”18, the 
type of person who is mobile, transitory, and not 
anchored. This does not mean, however, that the 
“marginal man” should be considered a ‘man at the 
edge’ or a ‘man on the periphery’, as he is often  
erroneously portrayed, but a man ‘straddling the 
boundary’. As a migrant distinguished by his ambi-
guity, he strides through a cultural realm that reveals 
few or no attributes of its past or future condition. 
Since this personality type fits into no particular 
context but, as de Certeau argues, moves incessantly 
between exoticism (what is new) and the “Sabbath of 
memory” (what is past)19, he is forever located in a 
place which could equally be called a non-place. He 
                                                 
16 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J. D. Waquant, An invitation to 
reflexive sociology, Chicago 1992, 104. 
17 Michael Makropoulos, Robert Ezra, Modernität zwischen 
Urbanität und Grenzidentität, in: Culture Club, Martin Hofmann, 
Tobias Korta, Sibylle Niekisch, Frankfurt am Main 2004, 54. 
18 Robert Ezra Park, Human Migration and the Marginal Man, in: 
Sennett Richard, ed., Classic Essays On The Culture of Cities, 
New York 1969. 
19 Michel de Certeau, Spatial Stories, in: The Practice of Everyday 
Life, transl. Steven Rendall, Berkeley 1988, 129. 






thereby occupies a non-attributable place without 
fixed address, from which he can relentlessly      
assume new positions. 
 
In conclusion, one could say that Park’s concept of 
the “marginal man” locates the ‘placeless place’ of the 
subject between the two processes of consolidating 
the subject through self-assertion and dissolving it 
through assimilation. In these terms then, “marginal 
man” is “a concept of subjectivity whose constructional 
principle [suggests] neither hermetic coherence nor open 
incoherence, but something one could describe as 
‘situatively limited incoherence’”.20 Accordingly, as Rolf 
Lindner remarks, “marginal man” can be considered 
the personified “bearer of cultural transformation” and 
the embodiment of “modern subjectivity”.21 Thus he 
lives on the ‘subjective margins’ of his own self, on 
the boundary of his own displacement.22               
Consequently, those occupying the margins do not 
merely personify the boundary but also personify 
transition—transgressive migrants, as it were.     
Always on the move, always intent on    change, they 
are constantly headed for new shores to forge links 
with their contexts. As such, the subject is analogous 
to the sea-borne ship described in Foucault’s study 
“Of Other Spaces”. Intended for translocation and 
ceaseless transition, the vessel pits itself against the 
infinite ocean—an ocean over which, in unflagging 
motion, boundaries are permanently redrawn and 
transgressed. And, as de Certeau observes, because 
these shifters never tire of charting new boundaries 
they assume the role of a  transgressive itinerant who 
“is the primum mobile […] from which all the action 
proceeds.”23 
 
It is a similar commuting itinerant that Gerald   
Raunig has in mind when he invokes the figure of 
Charon for his study of the aesthetics of             
t ransgression in  “Ästhetik  der  Grenzüber-
schreitung”.24 Whereas Virgil depicts Charon in  
                                                 
20 Makropoulos, Robert Ezra (see note 17), 54. 
21 Rolf Lindner, Die Entdeckung der Stadtkultur. Soziologie aus 
der Erfahrung der Reportage, Frankfurt am Main 1990, 211. 
22 Gilles Deleuze, Twelve Series of the Paradox, in: The Logic of 
Sense, transl. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, New York: 1990), 
104. 
23 Michel de Certeau, Railway Navigation and Incarnation, in: The 
Practice of Everyday Life, transl. Steven Rendall, Berkeley 1988, 
113. 
24 Virgil, The Aeneid, transl. Sarah Ruden, New Haven 2008. 
“The Aeneid” as a cheerless character whose task, for 
a small charge, is to ferry the dead in his boat across 
the river Acheron, the river of the underworld and 
the entrance to Hades, the realm of the dead, Raunig 
sees this ferryman as a translating entity who, like 
“marginal man”, “does not [scan] the dividing line be-
tween this world and the hereafter”25 but opens up a 
space of transition or in-between on the very bound-
ary separating the two. This point of transit creates 
the difference that weaves a connection between 
entities and at the same time enables transformation 
to occur. This not only makes him the link joining 
the two shores, but also an “intermediary space located 
within a difference“.26 As the scintillating protagonist 
lodged between the formative systems, he occupies 
an operative interstitial space by means of which, as 
Homi Bhabha points out, various differences begin 
to   oscillate in a transformative place of transit 
without any discernible hierarchy. 
 
Yet this existence in the in-between designates nei-
ther a space nor a place, but some third, interstitial 
entity, the non-place. This field is produced by 
boundary-crossing individuals whenever, in passing, 
they incorporate certain fragments of ‘spatial      
language’ while, at the same time, ignoring others. 
The subject in this process is neither here nor there, 
neither one nor the other. It positions itself, always 
subliminally, on a threshold—“[n]either excluded nor 
included […] in the fuzzy realm”27 of this blurred     
hiatus. The subject, then, is analogous to a liminal 
being which, as Victor Turner wrote in “The Ritual       
Process: Structure and Anti-Structure”, is situated      
between the positions of law, tradition,  
or conventions. It inhabits a liminal space of passage, 
through which it repeatedly marks, transforms and 
negotiates new positions within an existing      
framework.28 
 
This is how we arrive at such strange journeys as the 
‘voyage in place’. On this journey the transgressive 
  
                                                 
25 Gerald Raunig, Charon, Eine Ästhetik der Grenzübertragung, 
Wien 1999, 109. 
26 Rauning, Charon (see note 25), 109. 
27 Michel Serres, The parasite, transl. Lawrence R. Schehr, Min-
neapolis 2007, 246. 
28 The term ‘liminal’ is derived from Latin limen and means 
threshold, also implying transition across a boundary from one 
state to the next. 






migrants are motionless, but they are moving     
nonetheless. They do so regardless of whether they 
happen to be ‘staying’ on land, in the air, or on   
water. They ‘stay’ still as they keep moving. There, in 
this nowhere, is their place of residence. And since 
their home is tailored to match their passage, they 
are also no longer moving towards any particular 
place of residence. They convert each point along 
their journey into an absolutely local zone, a        
non-place—a line of thought that had already found 
application in antiquity.29 So place is always present 
wherever transgressive migrants happen to set their 
‘soles’. Thus every place is situated at a particular 
point in space, but not in an attributable place. In 
other words, transgressive migrants are always in 
their place, but they cannot be tied to any specific 
place. It is for this reason that the individual also has 
the capacity, over and again, to connect with his 
context in a space which encompasses as many di-
rections as it does orders. While Aristotle presumed 
that the body could arrive at its particular place 
through the influence of an outside force (or some 
higher and natural power beyond human control), 
the force envisaged in the notion of place discussed 
here, although still analogous to one that is         
‘externally’ applied, should nonetheless not be    
confused with the exertion of force postulated by 
Aristotle. Instead this force operates as a productive 
energy that, independent of the power of nature, is 
constituted somewhere between individuals and 
their relations to one another, and their context. 
Each evolving power relationship thus relates to a 
highly varied set of power relations, which is formed 
from countless forces generated through the       
interaction of unequal movements. 
 
Consequently, movements that occur can likewise 
not be treated as conventional movements. As    
described by Derrida in “Point de folie—Maintenant 
l’architecture”, the movements of individuals are 
comparable to the possibilities in throwing dice: they 
create an “opportunity for chance, formal invention, 
combinatory transformation, wandering”30, for         
nescience. As a result, this kind of ‘roaming’ means 
that each occurrence is both unpredictable and a 
                                                 
29 There the equivalent was the ‘genius loci’, the spirit of a place, 
which resided in each person as a protective force. 
30 Jacques Derrida, Point de folie—Maintenant l'architecture, 
essay accompanying the portfolio Bernard Tschumi, La Case 
Vide, La Villette 1985, London 1986, 70. 
matter of fortuity. The individual is subject to a 
permanent process of reorientation; since everything 
is determined by accident, he is caught up in an 
uninterrupted process of letting go and taking grasp 
again. No individual is able to evade this dynamic of 
change, the development it engenders, and its    
transience. Being entangled with space involves 
being continually immersed in its initiation, the 
process of becoming. 
 
Within this, individuals are capable of perceiving the 
world only in fragments, but never in its overriding 
complexity; inevitably, as each person’s range of 
vision is limited, every sensation and perception can 
only be partial. “The person who sees and the one who 
touches is not exactly myself, because the visible and the 
tangible worlds are not the world in its entirety.”31 Or put 
differently, we do not see the world “behind the back 
of our ‘consciousness’, […] but in front of us, as           
articulations of our field.”32 Through which the       
itineraries of this journey to nowhere are constantly 
changing, according to the particular moment, 
route, and movement. Thus individuals are forever 
inventing new possibilities of organizing space, since 
by making short cuts, diversions or improvised  
itineries they “privilege, transform or abandon spatial 
elements.”33 Accordingly, the creation of places    
resembles improvised bricolages which are         
assembled into a collage, and whose particular   
constellation cannot be controlled: they are         
articulated in their lacunae which are composed of 
shattered fragments of the world. One might say that 
individuals possess a kind of magnetic energy     
capable of attracting and reassembling “fragments of 
an exploded system”, enabling them “to bind energy 
freely available within a given field.”34 With his capacity 
they exude an attraction which, similar to the     
application of a force, accumulates and amalgamates 
all that is   disjunctive. Accompanied by place,   
transgressive migrants march forth, just as the   
                                                 
31 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of perception, transl. 
Colin Smith, London, New York 1962, 216. 
32 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The visible and the invisible, transl. 
Alphonso Lingis, Evanston Ill. 1968, 180. 
33 Michel de Certeau, Walking in the City, in: The Practice of 
Everyday Life, transl. Steven Rendall, Berkeley 1988, 98. 
34 Derrida, Point de folie (see note 30), 73. 






Roman fetials kept “ahead of social practices”, always 
with the task of opening up new fields.35 
 
The transgressive migrant thus ‘only’ needs to ‘look’ 
ahead und concentrate on locally encountered signs 
and symbols. “The waterpoint is reached only in order to 
be left behind; every point is a relay and exists only as a 
relay.”36 Hence the traveler loses what he has just 
gained. In the light of the conditions described here, 
place as a self-contained or territorial entity holds no 
further significance; of significance, instead, is its 
production, in other words its perception,           
appropriation, and attributive materialization.   
Consequently, place no longer corresponds to that of 
an object and its figure/ground placement. Rather, 
its existence is bound to a non-placement located at 
the convergence of object and subject. In the course 
of this event, the non-place makes unpredictable 
appearances in constantly changing guises. In other 
words, whenever a subject or a group of subjects 
correlate with an object, for the brief duration of a 
moment a transitory non-place occurs. 
 
Seen against this background, the individual can also 
no longer be considered a passenger or traveler   
passing through, someone who in Augé’s terms has 
gone to stay in a non-place for the duration of his 
journey. Rather, the individual assumes the status of 
a transient who, as long as he continues to act, is in 
transit and thus located in a non-place. Being in 
transit is therefore not a choice—it is a necessity! 
With this understanding, individuals are no longer 
at the mercy of the interplay of places and            
non-places, as Augé argues in his essay—they      
actively participate in their production. 
 
                                                 
35 In ancient Rome, establishing a new field of relations was still 
dependent on priestly officials known as ‘fetials’. Before declaring 
war, a military expedition, or a new alliance with another nation, 
fetials were dispatched to establish contact. Making contact 
happened in three stages: first within, but near the border; then on 
the border itself; and finally beyond the border on alien territory. 
This ritual procedure preceded every civil or military operation. 
In other words, the approach made by the fetials initiated a kind 
of intermediary space for military, diplomatic, or commercial 
activities due to be undertaken outside the country’s borders, 
which was commensurate with the terrain on which the battle was 
to be waged. 
36 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, The smooth and the striated, in: 
A thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia, Minneapolis 
1987, 380. 
Hence space can be characterized as the pragmatic 
intercourse with a place, made visible in the image of 
the transient who by means of his actions transforms 
the road, which is geometrically defined as a place, 
into a space or a non-place. What transpires is that, 
as a constellation of fixed elements, place undergoes 
a shift towards space as the stimulation of these fixed 
points, when one of the itinerant subjects changes 
location. Actions evolve in space, and space is    
generated through actions. Hence space is neither  
stationary nor static, but a social construct suffused 
with actions, one that is constituted via individuals 
and their power relations among one another. As a 
network of moving subjects, space is defined 
through interaction and activity. This field of tension 
between subject and object creates an environment 
of discovery, nescience, and uncertainty—a place no 
one knows. So what else can we do but continue to 
forbear the security of a fixed location, of staying 
put, which would safeguard the criteria of solid 






                                                 
37 Translated by Matthew Partridge 
